A Narrow Hypothesis

There is an hypothesis, based on random interviews with emigrants, that out-migration from the Maritimes ran mainly to “the Boston States” between 1879 and 1930, to Ontario between 1941 and 1970, and thereafter to Alberta (Burrill, 1992, p. xi). There were harvest excursions to western Canada between 1890 and 1930, but many who participated in those railroad organized events eventually migrated to New England. When farm labour was replaced with combines, and horses and wagons with automotive trucks, that trickle of westward migration dried up. Further, there remains even to the present some out-migration from the Maritimes to New England. However, neither the early movement to western Canada nor more recent movement to New England was or has been of sufficient volume to negate the hypothesis.

A Conjectured Broader Context

The context of this narrow hypothesis is a conjectured history of Atlantica, that is of an implicit political and explicit geographical unit bounded by the Hudson and St. Lawrence River drainage basins, on the southwest, west, and north, and by the North Atlantic Ocean on the east and southeast.

From earliest colonial times until the American Revolution, Acadia was gradually integrated into New England to form a recognizable economic and political unit within the British Empire. There had been intra-Atlantica trade before the arrival of Europeans, but prior to Europeanization exchange of goods took place between relatively stationary populations on land. The First Nations travelled between the sea and the mountains, not along the coast. Europeans, French and English, traded goods by sea along the coast, increasing the economic integration of the region. Indeed, as early as the mid-seventeenth century intra-Atlantica trade generated an embryonic political unit, Acadian and Yankee, protesting a degree of independence from Europe (Reid, 1981).

Though claimed by Massachusetts from the beginning of European settlement, and at times partially under British rule, it was not until the end of the Seven Years War, in 1763, that Acadia became definitively British under the name of Nova Scotia. Following the Expulsion of Acadians from Nova Scotia, between
1756 and 1763, and the expulsion of Tories from the United States, following the American War of Independence, a northeast movement of Planters and Loyalists constituted the arrival of the New England agricultural frontier in what is now the Maritimes. The first wave of this migration solidified the union of Atlantica in the British Empire, though, by Imperial decision, not under the jurisdiction of Massachusetts. The second migration marked the definitive political separation of northeast from southeast Atlantica. Economic separation resulting from the American victory in its War of Independence lasted until the Treaty of Paris in 1883. Thereafter, interrupted by the Napoleonic Wars, legal trade revived, particularly in the form of “free ports” after 1820, and under the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854-1866. Intra-Atlantica trade peaked for a second time in the period of Reciprocity. In the last third of the nineteenth century Canada, Britain, and the United States became protectionist. Barriers to trade and the intent of the Empire to support a confederated Canada separate from the United States worked against the reintegration of Atlantica. From this time on changes in technology restructured the North Atlantic economy leading to relative economic decline in Atlantica as a whole but particularly in the Maritimes, and to an out-migration of economically displaced Maritimers to the southeast and west. This adjustment to new conditions ceased as conditions changed again during the depressed years of the 1930s. From the Second World War to 1970 the flow of out-migration was to Ontario and Alberta. This same period, however, was marked by a new surge in the relentless integration of the Canadian and United States economies. So, toward the end of the twentieth century, as the private sectors of the North American economy integrated, Maritime-New England trade took on increased importance, and Atlantica again experienced a partial revival.

A Construction of some Elements in the Conjectured Broader Context

It is part of this broader conjecture that a flow of migrants from the Maritimes to New England between 1870 and 1930 was diverted to Ontario and the West between 1930 and 1950. The questions are: (a) do empirical data justify this assertion, and (b) what can be said of the circumstances under which the diversion occurred? The simple expected answers are (a) that the diversion did take place, and (b) from a short run perspective it was a response to individuals’ economic opportunity, while from a long run perspective the out-migration was a response to changes in transportation technique, shifting market structures related to transportation technique, the general restructuring and advance of the North American economy, institutional changes with respect to social welfare in both Canada and the United States, changes in immigration policy in the United States, and changes in values as a Canadian national identity emerged from two world wars and advances in communication and education.
3.

**The Numbers**

Records are thin on Canadian emigration to the United States, let alone on Maritime emigration to New England for the period 1851 to 1901. Still, Canadian born citizens of the United States increased steadily from 148,000 to 1,180,000 in those years (Brebner, 1940, p 184), and much information in the contemporary Maritime press indicates that an exodus to New England contributed to the increase (Brebner, 1940, *passim*). Until the First World War there was “a clockwise circular exchange of population which had set in with the industrialization of eastern North America and railway based extension of the North American agricultural frontier to the far west. Canadians moved from central Ontario into the northeastern and central states while Americans moved into the western provinces” (Brebner, 1940, p. 252). Maritime-born in the rest of Canada also increased over the period 1871 to 1921, from about 15,000 to 93,000 (Urquhart and Buckely, 1983, A 327-38, A 339-49), exhibiting a rate of increase similar to the rate of increase of Canadian-born in the United States, but involving much smaller absolute numbers. After 1941, however, Maritime-born in the rest of Canada increased at an increasing rate, while the numbers of Canadian-born in New England fell dramatically (Geospatial & Statistical Data Center, University of Virginia, 2004, 1900-1960). The elements of the broader conjecture put forward here for testing are not negated by these numbers.

While very little information is available on the relative contribution of the individual provinces to emigration from Canada, what data there is also does not negate the elements of the broader conjecture (Stone, 1969, pp. 25-26). Working from the *Historical Statistics of Canada* (op. cit. Urquhart and Buckely, 1983), using the natural rate of increase for Canada (*ibid.*, B15-B22), it is possible to estimate the population of the Maritime Provinces if there had been no emigration or immigration between 1921 and 1970. Assuming no significant immigration, the difference between that estimate and the reported population may be taken as total emigration. Migration from the Maritimes to other parts of Canada is available in the form of [ie. can be estimated by discounting] decennial numbers for migrants by province of birth (*ibid.*, A327-338). [by the Canadian death rate (*ibid.*, B23-24)]. The difference between this number and total emigration from the Maritimes can be taken as an approximation of the number of migrants entering the United States, and presumably New England. [A similar estimate can be made using a different set of numbers drawn from Urquhart and Buckely (*ibid.* A339-350)]

The first method yields net migration from the Maritimes to New England for the years 1931 to 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931-41</td>
<td>-10,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-51</td>
<td>-1,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>7,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>60,201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second method yields net migration from the Maritimes to New England for the years 1931 to 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931-41</td>
<td>-5.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-51</td>
<td>26,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>10,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>13,863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The size of the numbers for 1941-51 by the second Method and for 1961-71 by the first method is disconcerting though not surprising given the softness of the initial data, the heroic assumptions involved in the estimation process, and the probability of errors in calculation. Still, the estimates are not without significance.

Estimated migration from the Maritimes to the rest of Canada for the 1941-51 period is 105,420. Estimated migration from the Maritimes to the rest of Canada for the 1961-1971 period is 139,530 (Urquhart and Buckley, A327-338, B23-24). Accordingly, even though the estimated migration to New England for the periods 1941-51 and 1951-61 seems anomalously high, the numbers do not negate the conjecture that the stream of out-migration turned from New England to the rest of Canada between 1931 and 1971.

Using only the American decennial census the following estimates of the number Canadian-born living in the United States and their portion of the United States and Canadian populations, respectively, have been made (Vedder and Gallaway, 1970, p. 477).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Canadian-Born</th>
<th>Portion of U.S. Population</th>
<th>Portion of Canadian Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>147,711</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>249,970</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>493,464</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>717,157</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>980,938</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1,179,922</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,204,637</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,124,925</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,286,389</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,065,480</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,003,038</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>949,322</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the same source and some statistical methods (ibid, p. 486), Vedder and Gallaway concluded that Canadians tended to migrate to States close to the Canadian border, that until 1930 they tended to migrate to low population density
areas of the United States, and thereafter to more densely populated States. These numerical reconstructions also do not negate the conjecture put forward here.

Allan Brookes (1975-76, P. 43) was able to estimate the percentage distribution of expatriates of each of the three Maritime Provinces in States of the United States for the years 1860 to 1900. The numbers confirm that about 70% of emigrating Maritimers went to New England, and of those most went to Massachusetts.

This is as close as one comes to detailed “hard data” on migration from the Maritimes to New England over the 1870-1970 period.

The Secondary Literature

There have been at least three relevant flurries of interest in migration in Canada. Interest in migration of French Canadians to New England, and of Ontarians to the United States Midwest is related to what happened in Atlantica, but it is not of immediate relevance. In the 1930s, a number of central Canadians sketched the general pattern of Canadian migration, generating the so-called Displacement Theory. In the 1960s central Canadians pointed to the decline in importance of rural-urban shift and the rise in importance of inter-urban and inter-regional migration within Canada. In part related to this, but largely growing out of the search for causes of and cures for the lagging state of the Maritimes economy, Maritime researchers in the 1970s focussed on the nature and importance of regional internal and out-migration and its effect on regional economic development.

The 1930s group (See note 1.) registered some significant facts. Despite marked positive net immigration between 1901 and 1914, over the whole period from 1868 to 1925 Canada experienced positive net emigration. Indeed, even for the period from 1915 to 1925 losses through emigration were greater than gains through immigration. From 1921 to 1931 the net gain was relatively small. After 1914 the absolute numbers migrating to or from all countries fell sufficiently to indicate the end of a chapter in the history of global migration. By the 1920s the North American agricultural frontier had come to a standstill. At the same time, with the exception of the Maritime provinces, rural to urban migration slowed markedly, particularly in the early years of the decade. In short, by the end of the 1920s both external and internal migration came to virtual standstill in most of North America. Still, whatever happened globally, internal conditions in Atlantica made a difference there.

“Maritimers, the majority moving to the New England states, alone constituted 22 percent of the foreign-born population of Boston in 1900. In 1880 one-third of New Brunswickers in the United States lived in Maine, many employed as lumbermen .... The United States also drew a considerable number of Anglo-Canadian migrants from
the Maritimes, especially during the 1920-4 period when rural decline combined with industrial collapse to accelerate the out-migration of young people. ...” (Widdis, 1998, p. 69, 72-74. See note 1).

The Maritime population was less urbanized than that of central Canada throughout the entire 1870-1940 period (Anderson, 1966, Table 3). Further, it differed from Ontario not so much in its out-migration, as in its failure to attract immigrants to replace those who left. This difference was reduced to some extent by immigration in northeast Nova Scotia where there was expansion of iron and coal operations related to the building of railways in the rest of Canada. This exception notwithstanding, it is alleged that the rural-urban shift that marked the period everywhere in North America, in the Maritimes combined with relatively low urbanization and low immigration to keep the population and the economy on a slow growth path (Grant, 1937).

Researchers in the 1960s group (See note 2.) pointed to a significant change in the nature and direction of migration in Canada. Following the depression the Canadian born population in the United States declined steadily. In 1871 the United States contained 80% of Canadians residing outside of their province of birth. By 1961 this had fallen to about 30%. In the 1950s flows of migration within Canada, that is, from province to province, dwarfed external flows, and most internal migration was inter-urban, rather than rural-urban. Between 1956 and 1961 some 40% of Maritimers migrating within Canada went to Ontario. From Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia 10% went to Quebec. From New Brunswick 30% went to Quebec. In this period a significant portion of Maritime migrants moved to other Maritime Provinces, and a small portion scattered itself across the Prairie Provinces. (Stone, 1969, p. 36).

Researchers in the Maritimes in the 1970s (See note 3.) tried to support the theory that out migration was a cause of relative economic decline in the Maritimes, and not a consequence. In the attempt they pointed out that migrants from the Maritimes moved in stages, first to urban centres in the region and then to urban centres outside the region. In fact, this stage character of out-migration was typical of migration in all provinces in Canada over their periods of net out-migration, whether internal to Canada or out to the United States, but the stay in local urban centres was shorter in the Maritimes.

None of these accounts negate the conjecture that between 1930 and 1950 the main flow of emigrants from the Maritimes turned from “the Boston States” to Ontario in 1950 and to Alberta in 1970. The cause of the diversion was a simple change in the locus of economic opportunity (Vedder and Glallaway, 1970, p. 486). The question then becomes, what were the causes of the change in locus of opportunity? An answer to this question can be found in changes in technology and
market structure in relation to technology, in institutions and policy in relation to market structure, and in values in relation to all these.

United States Immigration Policy

From 1882 until 1917, only immigration from China was subject to legal restraint in the United States. Further, Nativists, who were pervasive in the immigration bureaucracy and who lobbied for exclusion of alien races and cultures, at no time objected to Canadian-born immigrants. Over the period from 1917 to 1924, laws were passed to deny entry to the illiterate. This may have excluded some Maritimers. Over the same years quotas were enacted primarily to deny entry to Polish and Italian migrants. No quota was placed on persons born in Canada, or having lived in Canada for more than five years. Still, some United States immigration laws and regulations probably made a difference for Canadians.

At the beginning of the First World War the United States followed other countries in requiring immigrants to acquire a visa before entry. The Passport Control Act in 1918 required that all aliens acquire the visa from American Consuls or other accredited representatives abroad before arriving at an American immigration station. Initially the regulation was for the war period, but the 1924 Quota Act made the visa requirement permanent. The Immigration Act of 1917 imposing the literacy test also included a clause excluding those “likely to become a public charge”, which, in the depression of that year, resulted in most working class aliens being deemed inadmissible (Tichenor, 2002, p. 156). In 1932, President Hoover claimed that tougher enforcement of the “likely to become a public charge” clause caused legal immigration to plummet from 242,000 in 1931 to 36,000 in 1932 (Tichenor, ibid.).

The extent to which these regulations affected Canadians from the Maritimes cannot be known with any certainty. The level of enforcement due to concern and feasibility would have been a determining factor. Those in favour of strict enforcement, the Nativists, were not adverse to Canadian immigration. Further, given the ease of transportation from the Maritimes and the size of the relevant welcoming immigrant communities, Maritimers in particular would have had little difficulty in bypassing official channels. Enforcement of regulations was “toughened” in periods of economic downturn, but it is a nice question as to how much it was the downturn in economic conditions and how much it was toughened regulations that reduced the flow of immigrants.

The Second World War was an occasion for further restrictions on migration into the United States, but it also generated a demand for immigrant labour. The “Red Scare” of the subsequent Cold War period did not affect Canadian immigrants, nor did the continued pressure from Nativists who peopled the immigration apparatus and favoured the Nordic race.
United States immigration policy underwent a sea-change in the post war period. In 1952, in response to Cold War diplomatic demands and in acknowledgement of the globalization of United States economic interests, the McCarron-Walter Immigration Act eliminated all racial and ethnic barriers to entry. It gave the Executive an override on all immigration laws, and the Executive generously exercised its override with respect to areas of military tension such as Vietnam, Cuba, Palestine and Tibet. In 1965, all nation-specific quotas were abolished, though an overall cap was set, and Western Hemisphere immigration was limited to 170,000 per year.

In general, it would seem that United States immigration policy and laws had some effect on migration from the Maritimes, but perhaps not a decisive effect. There were always loopholes. If Maritimers could not give evidence that they were not going to be indigent, they could get a temporary visa, acquire employment, and then apply for immigrant status. There was, then, some legal constraint, but it would seem that the turning of the direction of migration from New England to the rest of Canada cannot be explained by United States immigration legislation alone.

Social Security Legislation
Quite apart from direct regulation of immigration the enactment of social security legislation in the United States would have made a difference. The Social Security Act passed by Congress in 1935 provided federal insurance against dependent old age, and encouraged the states to provide insurance against unemployment. The system was not comprehensive and differed from state to state, but it was slowly strengthened and expanded in subsequent years, including, by 1965, federal-state medicare for those not covered by private insurance and not able to meet its costs (Wilcox, 1969, pp. 86-102). The point here is not that the Canadian social security system was more comprehensive than the United States system and so induced Maritimers to stay in Canada, but that access to the system in the United States required application, and application required immigrants to declare their immigrant status. That is to say, access required migrants from the Maritimes to pass literacy tests, show that they were not likely to become a public charge, and to have acquired a visa. Further, if the states were like the provinces in Canada, some would have required an extended period of residence before eligibility. In short, the rising barriers to immigration into the United States would have acquired a more binding force for Maritimers once the social safety net was in place. This effect would have been accentuated by the later elaboration of a presumably more comprehensive net on a national basis in Canada.

Elaboration of the Canadian Social Safety Net
The roots of the Canadian social security system were laid well before 1940. They rested in provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, health, education, and welfare. To the extent that social security was the substance of citizenship in the
minds of people, prior to 1940 primary citizenship was provincial.

There were two substantial changes in the nature of the Canadian social security system over the 1929-1949 period of economic depression and war, particularly between 1935 and 1945 (Guest, 1985, passim., Strain and Hum, 1987, passim.). First, the federal government, or the federal government supporting and encouraging provincial governments with grants-in-aid, elaborated a welfare system that was both more comprehensive and national in scope. There was a search for a “national minimum” of support. Accordingly, primary citizenship became national rather than provincial. Second, the supports tended to become “demigrants”. That is to say, the notion that one had to pass a means test to get public support became less a characteristic of the system. Means tests were replaced by citizenship rights, and citizenship was Canadian. These changes did not occur all at once, and there was backsliding as provincial and federal governments attempted to pass expensive responsibilities on to one another. Residence requirements were only reluctantly surrendered by provincial governments, but Canadian citizenship gradually emerged as the sole requirement for assistance for the unemployed, for the aged, and for children under the Family allowance scheme.

This change in the social security system had to be of some importance to those leaving the Maritimes to look for employment elsewhere. Indeed, one of the arguments for national rather than provincial unemployment insurance was the support it would give to the mobility of labour. For Maritimers exposure to the risk of indigence was reduced in job search in the rest of Canada compared to what it would be in the United States. In short, though a social security system was elaborated in the United States in these years, in some matters before it appeared in Canada, citizenship requirements and entitlements, and State imposed conditions would have favoured migration to other parts of Canada for Maritimers.

**The Push and Pull of Economic Opportunity**

In addition to, and probably surpassing other factors, the availability of employment and an improved standard of living made a difference in the direction of migration, but, again, substantiating this in the case of Maritime emigration to New England or the rest of Canada is not a simple matter (Sinclair, 1966, passim). Over the period 1901 to 1911 when GNP per capita was rising in both countries but was higher in the United States than in Canada emigration of Canadians to the United States declined markedly. Indeed emigration of native Canadians to the United States fell from 1881 to 1911 through a full long swing and a half in GNP per capita with Canadian and United States per capita income rising and falling together. Still, from 1911 until 1921, when Canadian GNP per capita was falling and that of the United States rising, emigration of native born Canadians to the United States rose dramatically only to fall even more dramatically at the end of the 1920s. Thereafter emigration to the United States of native born Canadians became relatively
disassociated from the trend of GNP per capita in both countries (Sinclair, 1966, pp. 164-189). It would seem that fluctuations in the general level of economic activity (presumably determining availability of work and level of remuneration) whatever influence they had on Canadian internal migration, had much less influence on emigration to the United States than did the changing regional/industrial structure of the North American economy. Further, these observations refer to all native Canadians, not specifically to Maritimers. That is to say, all-Canada and all-U.S. averages may not well reflect conditions in Atlantica.

In the 1890s the pull of available employment was evident in the location of Maritimers in the United States (Brookes, pp 40-41). Migrants going to the U.S. from Prince Edward Island showed a tendency terminate in agricultural regions; from New Brunswick, in forestry regions; and from all provinces in shipbuilding or carpentry in Massachusetts. Maritimers went where their skills could be put to work. Given the commercial, trades, and resource-based economy from which they came, few chose to work in factories.

At the same time as migration became inter-urban rather than rural-urban, as social security supports began to favour internal migration in Canada, and as restrictions on migration to the United States were tightening, New England’s economy experienced relative stagnation. Growth in the United States and Canada in this period occurred primarily in the Midwest, and the West. The decline in New England was not just a consequence of the depression of the 1930s. Major shifts in industry and regional location of industry kept New England in a state of relatively slow growth through to the 1970s.

New England’s per person income as a percentage of United States’ per person income fell from 134% in 1880 to 118% in 1920, and had risen only to 125% by 1940 (Temin, 2000, p. 158). Manufacturing employment in New England grew by only 01.0% between 1950 and 1970. Population increased by 34%, but it fell from 6.1% to 5.3% of total United States population. Massachusetts experienced falling immigration from 1900 to 1920, and negative net migration thereafter to 1950. Maine experienced negative net migration from 1870 to 1890 and from 1920 to 1950. New Hampshire experienced negative net migration for 1910 to 1930 and from 1940 to 1950 (Lee, pp.149-154). During this period, that is over the turn of the century to the 1930s, New England’s strong position in textiles, footwear, and paper was lost to the Southeast, Southwest, and Pacific Coast regions. After 1970, New England experienced a revival based on electricity, electronic equipment, and precision instruments (Bellan and Niosi, 1988). Indeed, between 1960 and 1970, New England’s population out-grew that of the Northeast in general, but change in its industrial structure called for a different kind of worker. In the 1960s the portion of immigrants in professional occupations was close to 25%, compared with a mere 1% in 1901-1910 (Easterlin, R.A., Fuchs, V., and Kuznets, S., 1980, p. 302). Labourers
and domestic servants were close to 20% of immigrants in the 1960s, compared to 70% in 1901-1910 (*ibid.* P. 303-4). The McCarron-Walter Act of 1952, and the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 – the former stressing entry requirements based on needed skills, reuniting families, and asylum for political refugees, the latter ending the quota system – may have made a difference, but the change in legislation was more an effect than a cause of new circumstances. Between 1920 and 1970 the service sector of the American Economy, excluding unskilled workers, grew from 30% of total employment to over 60% (Hughes and Cairn. p. 517). Clearly, the whole structure of economic activity in Atlantica had changed, and the change would have affected the flow of migrants from the Maritimes. During the great emigration from the Maritimes to New England, 1870-1930, most migrants were semi-skilled labourers, tradesmen of sorts, and, if female, domestics.

**Changes in Transportation Technique**

Changes in transportation technique between 1870 and 1930 surely made some difference, but the decline of the wooden sailing ship, and, indeed, the decline of the steam locomotive and the railways by the end of the first half of the twentieth century occurred in the context of other forces. No doubt the largely schooner connection between Maritimes and New England in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the incursions of steamships and railways was associated with a changing but particular pattern of trade and general economic structure. All three (the wooden sailing ship, the steam locomotive railways, and the particular pattern of trade) passed away in first quarter of the twentieth century indicating the presence of a cause or causes other than but suffered by all three.

**Shipping**

Though it is reductionist to do so, the story of the decline can be told in terms of shipping alone. In the last third of the nineteenth century abundance of coastal shipping in smaller (less than 250 tons) sailing ships made it easier for the dispersed settlements of the Maritimes to continue in existence. (Sager, 1990, p. 194). The beginning of decline came in 1856 at the end of the Crimean War. From then on investment by United States agents turned inland to expansion in the West. In consequence, the United States overseas fleet was replaced by foreign-owned vessels, including Maritime-owned vessels. The latter carried European, West Indian, and Maritime products (fish, agricultural, mining, and forest products) to and from New England and the Middle States of the east coast. So it was that both the life of the wooden ship building and shipping industries in the Maritimes and the viability of markets for their products was extended until the turn of the century. (Sager, 1990, pp. 97-103). By then, however, New England had canal and railway access to less expensive and more abundant agricultural produce, coal, and forest products in inland sources. Service to and demand for the products of the scattered agriculture, fishing, forestry and mining communities of the Maritimes declined as canals, railways, and steamships became the primary means of transportation (Sager, 1990,
Familiarity with and ease of transportation between the Maritimes and New England by sea was part of this declining set of economic conditions, and ease of transportation continued long enough to facilitate the withdrawal of population from the Maritimes to New England (Saunders, 1939, p. 42). Indeed it is a fair conjecture that by the end of the nineteenth century, facilitated in part by inexpensive steamer connections between Maritime and New England ports, not just people, but clusters of related economic activities and agents migrated to the southwest of Atlantica.

The scattered agricultural, forest, and shipbuilding communities of the northeast that were losing their access to goods, markets, and information by way of smaller wooden sailing ships used their increasingly obsolescent means of transportation and communication to facilitate an exodus to similar, though not identical, employments in the southwest (Brookes, 1975-76, p. 43). A galaxy of interrelated activities drained from one part of Atlantica to another until the depression of the 1930s ended an era and laid the foundation for another.

**Railways**

The flourishing of Maritime shipping in the last half of the nineteenth century was a last hurrah, a flight of Minerva’s Owl, as railways divided Atlantica by attaching it to the centre of the continent. In the Maritimes the need for Imperial and, after Confederation, Dominion government financial assistance, and the political interference, chicanery, and corruption involved in national, transcontinental railway construction in Canada ensured that rail lines would lie along militarily strategic routes with respect to the United States, and that they would tie the Maritimes to Canada. (Easterbrook and Aitken, 1958, pp. 301-305; Woods, 1992; Lamb, 1977).

At first the proposals and charters were for rail connections within the Maritimes, indeed, within Atlantica. The history of the European and North American is particularly instructive. The line was to be a principle conduit of Euro-American trade, running from Portland, Maine to St. John, New Brunswick, and thence through Moncton to Cape Breton and, at one point of time, Halifax. The Imperial government refused to support financially the Canadian portion of the line, and after many adventures and misadventures, out of bits an pieces of the European and North American there emerged the successful proposal of the Intercolonial. Initially the European and North American was intended to connect with the St. Lawrence and Atlantic at Portland to provide a line between the Maritimes and Montreal. The province of New Brunswick completed construction from St John to the Maine border at Vanceboro in 1869. The Maine portion of the line, however, was not completed until the late 1890s. In the meantime, between 1881 and 1888, in the usual fog of subterfuge, party influence, and government interference, the Canadian Pacific Railway, seeking a “fast short line” to St. John and Halifax from Montreal, built, bought out, and leased a number of small lines across Quebec and northern Maine to a junction with the proposed European and North American at Vanceboro.
The CPR Short Line, like most if not all Maritime railways, was never a paying proposition. In part there was too much competition from competing railways and from shipping, and none of the connected lines was “fast”. Further, Halifax, faced by competition from New York, Boston, and Montreal, failed to develop sufficiently important steamship connections with Europe. Railways did not bring the prosperity to the Maritimes that, perhaps, it brought to central Canada, and neither St. John or Halifax became the important Atlantic outlet for transcontinental Canadian traffic.

All of this is an account of elements in, not an explanation of, the relative decline in the rate of growth and development in the Maritimes. It is only a partial account of the decline of the economic integrity of Atlantica. What happened in New England is, perhaps, a more important part of the story.

New England, like the Maritimes, did not have success in extending transportation by way of canals. Accordingly, with its eye on the advance of New York business along Long Island Sound by ship, and up the Hudson River by canal to the Great lakes, Boston lost no time in attempting to cut off the trade of its rival by building railways west to the Hudson at Albany, and northwest to Lake Champlain and Montreal. Construction of roads northeast along the Atlantic coast moved more slowly and was thwarted by the ambitions of Portland, which, in the scramble for transcontinental traffic decided to be independent of and even a rival of Boston (Kirkland, 1948, pp. 192-214).

The Eastern Railway and the Boston and Maine Railway proceeded in rivalry northeast along the coast as far as Portsmouth. The Boston and Maine, building with aid from the State of Massachusetts, connected with the Portland, Saco and Portsmouth Railway in 1843. The latter was virtually wholly owned in Boston. While this was occurring, in 1845 John A. Poor, the Portland promoter of the European and North American through St. John to Cape Breton, obtained a charter for the Atlantic and St. Lawrence to connect with the St. Lawrence and Atlantic from Montreal. Boston interests attempted to block the advance of the joint lines to prevent competition with their own connections to Montreal. Maine responded by legislating no connections with the Atlantic and St. Lawrence except to the east, thus cutting off its hinterland connection with Boston. Further, the Montreal to Portland lines were built with a 5′,6″ gage, to further inhibit any connection with the standard 4′,8″ gage railways to the southwest. The line was opened in 1853 with no participation from Boston interests, and with a large portion of the economic connection between Boston, Maine, and the Maritimes eliminated. In short, the exigencies of the Railway Epoch further weakened the connection between northeast and southwest Atlantica.
Over the last half of the nineteenth century roads were built from Portland through Bangor to the Canadian border and the Vanceboro connection with St. John in New Brunswick. Roads were eventually built into northern Maine, though financing was hard to come by. Before the end of the century, objections from Portland interests notwithstanding, Maine repealed its legal obstacle to connections with lines to the west, and Massachusetts promoters again took some financial interest in Maine railways. By then, however, the era was coming to an end, and Maine and the Maritimes were substantially alienated from the economic interests of Boston. Both had chosen to connect with what was, in comparison with Montreal rather than Boston.

Railways facilitated reorientation and decentralizing of economic activity in Atlantica. The drain of population to the southeast at the end of the Railway Epoch was a lagged consequence. Ironically, the sustained unity of Atlantica between 1870 and 1920 by way of migration was a consequence of the weakening of that unity in other respects over the same period.

The Pattern of Trade

With respect to trade, what took place was also part of the migration of elements of a declining economy. The arrival of the metal steamship and the railway changed the pattern of traffic and moved the emphasis from dried fish to fresh fish. Small ports died and the trade in provisions and the building of boats died with them. New England found rail connections to less expensive inland sources of coal, forest products, and agricultural produce. Further, the switch to an east-west flow of traffic was hastened by the adoption of national policies of tariff protection in both Canada and the United States. Excluded from New England markets, Maritime fishers entered as crew and officers on “white washed” New England vessels. As the truck system serviced by schooners collapsed, the inhabitants of the small ports moved to “the Boston States”.

Atlantica flourished between the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence. The War of Independence and its consequences politically and economically divided Atlantica. Following the Peace of Paris in 1783 there was a brief economic revival until the hostilities of the Napoleonic Wars again disrupted legal trade. After the War of 1812, gradual dismantling of the mercantile system of the First British Empire returned an implicit, if only economic, life to Atlantica. But the entity remained divided by the interests of the British Empire, on the one hand, and those of the United States, on the other. After the American Civil War and Canadian Confederation, the Dominion government pressed Imperial authorities to turn public policy in the Maritimes toward Canadian aspirations. (Innis, 1940, pp. 353, 364). At a critical time in its adjustment to profound technical and institutional change, the Maritimes was caught in the middle between Britain, the United States
and Canada. Quarrels over fishing rights that showed up in the terms of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 and the Treaty of Washington in 1871 (in both cases negotiated by Britain with Canada in tow to serve the interests of those two jurisdictions) indicate that more was at stake than the trade in fish. American vessels fishing in Maritimes waters, quite apart from smuggling, engaged in an on shore trade of tobacco, spirits, clothing, boots and shoes, flour, tea, and molasses in return for vegetables, herring, salt, barrels, and general provisions (Innis, 1940, pp. 334-5). When steam trawlers and the protectionist policies of the Empire, Canada, and the United States put and end to this truck economy, out-migration was inevitable, and many, like the fishers on “white washed Yankees”, stayed with Atlantica by moving to New England.

The decline (if such there was) in Atlantica trade that accompanied the out migration is impossible to document. Much of it was not accounted for in official registers in the first place. Further, the keeping of statistics was assigned exclusively to the Dominion government by the British North America Act (Dunlop, 2002), and records of provincial external trade were swallowed up in overall Canadian numbers. Without a doubt the intention was to create a separate nation in North America, and that meant explicit or implicit suppression of many aspects of the New England-Maritimes connections that constituted Atlantica.

Data on the volume of trade between the Maritime Provinces and New England in the period are thin and unreliable, but not totally non-existent.

Saunders history of the Maritimes estimates the portion of Maritime trade going to the United States at mid-nineteenth century. We may conjecture that most of those exports were destined for New England. Nova Scotia’s exports to the United States ran between 25% and 40% of its total exports, generally rising from 1852 until 1866. New Brunswick’s exports to the United States ran between 10% and 30% of its total exports, generally rising from 1852 until 1866. Prince Edward Island’s exports to the United States ran from 10% of its total exports to over 50% of its total exports. The 10% figure belongs to the 1852 and 1866 reports. Between these years the portion for P.E.I. was generally over 30% and twice over 50%, with the portion generally rising as the years passed (Saunders, 1984 (1939) p. 104). Saunders does not report the states to which the trade was directed. The general increase in the portion of trade going to the United States can be attributed to the easy conditions of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854-1866.

The Canada Year Book continued to report this data until 1886. (See 1886, pp. 187-8, 225). In 1868 37% of Nova Scotia’s and 18% of New Brunswick’s exports went to the United States. In 1878 the portions were 22%, 20%, and for P.E.I. 22%, respectively. In 1886 the portions were 32%, 28%, and 43%, respectively. (4)
Percentage of Maritimes Exports Going to the United States: 1852-1886.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nova Scotia</th>
<th>New Brunswick</th>
<th>Prince Edward Island</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no evidence here that would clearly indicate a decline in the Atlantica connection in trade between 1852 and 1886. If there was a decline it came in the century between 1890 and 1990, after which one may conjecture a revival. In the nineteen nineties international trade out-grew trade with the rest of Canada in all three Maritime Provinces. In 2002 exports to destinations outside of Canada (not only to the United States) were 52% of all exports for Prince Edward Island, 54% for Nova Scotia, and 57% for New Brunswick (http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/11-621-MIE/11-621-MIE200).

The Role of Values

The decline of the British Empire, reliance of have-not provinces on federally mediated transfers from other provinces, the results of schooling, and the rise in national patriotism generated by Canada’s participation in two world wars, no doubt have had an effect on the sense of nationalism in Canada. The rise of Canadian nationalism, in turn, and the anti-American element that has been a significant element therein, cannot have served to maintain a sense of solidarity in the information environment of Atlantica over the 1870-1970 period. Indeed, in absence of empirical information on trade, the diversion of Maritimes out-migration from New England to other parts of Canada notwithstanding, it still may be conjectured that decline in the cohesion of Atlantica over the middle of the twentieth century has been largely one of perception.

Conclusion and Prospect

There was a shift in the flow of out-migration from the Maritimes over the 1930-1950 period. The cause of the shift is to be found in the multiple forces changing the economic and social integration of Atlantica. What difference New England’s revival in the information economy of the late twentieth century, and what difference the increasing continentalization of the Canadian economy might make in Atlantica would be in the field of trade, and perhaps trade and capital flows, rather than migration. Primary citizenship in matters of social welfare continue to strengthen, while the citizenship of goods and money become increasingly
transnational, and, perhaps, automobile, truck, and air transport make cross border commerce notionally and economically more to be chosen than in the Railroad Epoch.

Notes


(4) Data on trade between provinces and foreign jurisdictions did not become available again until 1988. Shortly after, with the intensification Canada-United States trade relations a series of studies on the importance of international borders

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